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ABSTRACT
The focus of this paper is to compute the optimal progressivity of the income tax code
for Turkish tax system. Following [Conesa and Krueger, 2006], we employ a dynamic general
equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. Labor productivity shocks in the absence of in-
surance markets create more dispersed income and wealth distribution. A progressive tax system
serves as a partial insurance mechanism. Thus, progressivity decreases differences in income that
occur during good times and bad times and enhances welfare. On the other hand, progressive
taxation distorts incentives for labor supply and saving decisions of private households. The
policy maker, thus faces nontrivial trade-offs between the three effects of progressive taxation;
social insurance, equity and labor supply efficiency when designing the income tax code.
A flat tax rate of 23% with a fixed deduction of half of the average income, which is
roughly 3800TL, maximizes the utilitarian steady state welfare criterion. A tax reform towards
this tax system results in welfare gains which is equivalent to 6.2% higher consumption in every
possible state of world. Analysis of the Gini coefficients indicates that under the optimal tax
system, income, wealth and consumption are more equally distributed.
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TU¨RKI˙YE I˙C¸I˙N OPTI˙MAL ARTAN ORANLI VERGI˙LENDI˙RME
Esra Alpay
Ekonomi, MA Tezi, 2009
Tez Dans¸manı: Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. Remzi Kaygusuz
Anahtar Kelimeler: Artan Oranlı Vergilendirme, Optimal(En uygun) Vergilendirme, Du¨z
Oranlı Vergilendirme, Sosyal Sigorta
O¨ZET
Tu¨rkiye vergilendirme sistemi ic¸in gelir vergisinin optimal artan oranlılıgˇının hesaplanması
bu tezin odak noktasıdır. Bu c¸alıs¸mada [Conesa and Krueger, 2006] makalesini takip ederek,
heterojen bireyli dinamik genel denge modeli kullandık. Sigorta pazarlarının eksikligˇinde, is¸c¸i
verimliligˇine gelen s¸oklar, gelir ve servet dagˇılımını daha dengesiz hale getirmektedir. Artan oranlı
vergilendirme, kısmen sigorta mekanizması go¨revini go¨rmektedir. Bo¨ylece artan oranlılık, iyi ve
ko¨tu¨ zamanlarda olus¸an gelir farklılıklarını azaltarak, refahı iyiles¸tirmektedir. Digˇer yandan
artan oranlı vergilendirme, bireylerin is¸gu¨cu¨ arzını ve tasarruf kararlarını bozmaktadır. Vergi
politikalarını olus¸turan birim, gelir vergisi sistemini olus¸tururken, artan oranlı verginin, sosyal
sigorta, hakkaniyet ve is¸gu¨cu¨ arzı verimliligˇi u¨zerindeki etkileri arasında, sonucu kesin olmayan
o¨du¨nles¸melerle kars¸ılas¸maktadır.
Faydacıl duragˇan durum sosyal refah kriterini kullanarak, Tu¨rkiye ic¸in optimal gelir ver-
gisinin, mevcut ortalama gelirin yaklak yarısı, 3800TL, oranında sabit indirim ve %23 oranında
du¨z oranlı bir vergi seviyesi oldugˇunu bulduk. Buldugˇumuz vergi sistemine dogˇru yapılacak bir
vergi reformu, olası her durumda %6.2’lik tu¨ketim artıs¸ı s¸eklinde bir refah artıs¸ıyla sonuc¸lanacaktır.
Gini katsayısı analizleri, optimal vergi sistemi altında tu¨ketim, servet ve gelirin daha es¸it dagˇıldıgˇını
go¨stermis¸tir.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the public economics literature much emphasis given to the role of progressive taxes in
affecting the consumption, labor supply and saving (capital accumulation) decisions of private
households and firms. Progressive income tax systems has both beneficial and undesirable effects.
They are beneficial in the sense that they provide more equal distribution of income, and through
this, indirect effects can be seen as more equality in wealth distribution and increase in welfare.In
addition to this in the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty, if the economy lacks private insurance
markets, progressive taxes may make individuals to smooth their consumption over time. On
the other hand, economy faces undesired costs due to reduced incentives for labor supply and
saving decisions. Hence the progressive tax system involves trading off the benefits due to equity
and social insurance with the costs due to reduced incentives. Thus the decision of the policy
maker about the income tax code becomes more complicated.
The literature begins by the pioneering work of [Mirrlees, 1971]. In the paper the eco-
nomic theory about the trade of between equality and labor supply inefficiency is initialized,
and it investigates the question of which principles should govern an income tax code ; how tax
schedule would look like; and what degree of inequality would remain once it was established.
[Varian, 1980] shows that the optimal redistributive tax involves trading off the benefits due
to social insurance with the costs due to reduced incentives by computing some algebraic and
numeric examples. On the capital income side of this literature, [Hubbard and Judd, 1986] take
policy simulation models that ignore ”liquidity constraints” result in flawed tax policy analy-
sis into consideration and analyze the impact of liquidity constraints on consumption functions
and conclude that in the presence of capital market imperfections, capital income tax may be
optimal. [Aiyagari, 1995] shows that with incomplete markets and borrowing constraints, the
optimal tax rate on capital is positive even in the long run, thus setting income tax to zero may
result in welfare losses. With this conclusion they opposed to the results that [Judd, 1985] and
[Chamley, 1986] arrived by showing optimal tax rate on capital income does tend to zero in the
long run.
All those papers investigate just the qualitative implications for the optimal tax code, in
order not to lose the analytical tractability. [Conesa and Krueger, 2006] contributes to those
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papers by investigating quantitative implications of the optimal tax code. In the paper, they
take into account an economic environment with the presence of social insurance effect, labor
supply efficiency and equity effects of progressive taxes at the same time and quantitatively
characterize the optimal progressivity of the income tax code.
In this paper, in a period where tax policy and tax reform are important items on the
Turkish policy agenda, we computed the optimal progressivity of the income tax code for Turkey
economy in a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and uninsurable
labor productivity risks This paper mainly adopts the model used in [Conesa and Krueger, 2006]
and analyze the Turkish tax system using long run statistics of Turkey.
People born in an overlapping generations economy with different skills and throughout
their working time they are hit by the idiosyncratic, serially correlated income shocks 1 The
insurance opportunity of these income shocks is very restricted by assumption, there is just one-
period risk-free bond to be traded and cannot be shortened. In each period individuals decide
on how to divide their discrete time between labor, leisure and how to allocate their earnings
between consumption and savings . Those allocation decisions are affected by the tax code. The
government levies taxes on individuals in two forms, one is the proportional consumption taxes,
and the other is the income taxes and using the revenue from them, finance the fixed exogenous
amount of its expenditures. Since the main focus of this paper is income tax code, we take
consumption tax as given. The income tax code is taken from [Berliant and Gouveia, 1993]. It
was restricted to lie in a particular class of functional forms and it is relied on the equal sacrifice
approach [Berliant and Gouveia, 1993]. The main feature of the income tax code which is very
useful to our analysis is, by changing the parameters of the tax code we can face a big spectrum of
tax systems, i.e. with the same function, a purely proportional income tax code, progressive tax
codes, and regressive tax codes can be created. And although it creates such a big spectrum of
tax systems, it is governed by just few parameters, thus numerical optimization over the income
tax code becomes feasible.
In order to determine the optimal tax system we need to choose a social welfare function to
evaluate policies. The welfare criterion we utilize is ex-ante (before ability is realized) expected
(with respect to idiosyncratic shocks) lifetime utility of a newborn in a stationary equilibrium.
1See [Huggett, 1993] and [Aiyagari, 1994] for a detailed description.
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Progressive taxes play a positive role in achieving a more equal distribution of income and welfare
(or in other words, they provide insurance against being born as a low-ability type). They also
provide a partial substitute for missing insurance markets against idiosyncratic income shocks
during a persons life. On the other hand, labor-leisure and consumption-saving decisions are
distorted by the potential presence of tax progressivity. And also with this welfare criterion, the
policy maker is assigned to concern for insurance against idiosyncratic shocks and redistribution
across households with different ability, since transferring an extra dollar from the highly able
to the less able, ceteris paribus, increases social welfare since the value function characterizing
lifetime utility is strictly concave in the ability to generate income2. The policy maker then has
to trade-off this concern against the standard distortions these taxes impose on labor supply and
capital accumulation decisions.
The main finding in this paper is that, the optimal tax code for Turkey can be approximated
by a marginal tax rate of 23% with a fixed deduction of half of the average taxed income rate
of Turkey. Aggregate output is greater of amount 2.33%, in this tax code compared to the
benchmark economy. And although average hours worked declined by a huge amount of 1.43%,
aggregate labor supply almost increased which is the sign of a shift of labor supply from low-
productivity to high-productivity individuals. With the optimal tax system, tax burden on the
middle class of the income distribution increase substantially, whereas the lower tail and the
upper tail of the income distribution face a substantially lower income tax bill.
Social welfare increases very substantially with the optimal tax code, so that to make people
indifferent between being born in a steady state economy with the optimal tax code we found and
being born in a benchmark steady state economy, we have to increase consumption uniformly by
6.2% across all agents and all states of world.
Parallel to the findings of [Hall and Rabushka, 1995]in favor of flat tax , our results have
mainly the same intuition that is, decreased marginal tax rates that high ability, high productivity
individuals face resulted in higher labor supply and saving incentives which is working in the
way to decrease the equality of the distribution. But on the other hand, fixed deduction provides
the desired redistribution and insurance. We showed the quantitative importance of the fixed
deduction by employing a pure flat tax. And the results are dramatic that although aggregate
2See,[Conesa et al., 2005].
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output increased by 5.2%, welfare reduced by .5% compared to the benchmark economy.
The organization of the remaining part is as follows. In Section 2, the economic environ-
ment and definition of the equilibrium are presented. Section 3 presents the description of the
functional forms, calibration of the model economy, and computational experiments. Section 4
presents the optimal tax code and the analysis of results. Section 5 concludes.
4
2 THE MODEL
In this section, following [Conesa and Krueger, 2006], we describe the economic environment
and define the equilibrium. The benchmark economy is based on an overlapping generations
model, consisting of heterogeneous agents, a representative firm and a government. Individuals
get utility from consumption and leisure. They are endowed with one unit of productive time,
for either supplying labor or for leisure. The representative firm produces a single good with
standard Cobb-Douglas production technology using capital and labor as inputs. Government
administers the social security system and levies consumption tax and income tax on individuals
to finance its expenditures.
2.1 The economic environment
2.1.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by J overlapping generations. In each period a new generation is born
and generations grow with a constant rate n. After the age of retirement individuals face a death
probability which is positive all the time. Let the notation for the conditional survival probability
from age j to age jt+1 is ψj = prob(alive atj + 1|alive atj). Agents live up to the age J and
die for sure at this age i.e. ψJ = 0. In our economy, the assumption of death probability after
retirement results in a part of the population leaving accidental bequests. We denote them by
Trt. Those bequests accrue to the government budget as general revenue. Agents have a certain
retirement age jr. When they retire,they receive social security payments SSt at an exogenously
specified replacement rate bt of current average wages. Government levies proportional labor
income tax τss,t on individuals to finance social security payments.
2.1.2 Endowments and Preferences
Individuals born with zero assets and during their lifetime they have one unit of productive time
in each period. Agents devote this one unit of time to work in the labor market and keep the
remaining as leisure. Agents are heterogeneous with respect to three variables which results in
5
high spectrum for labor productivity differences and wage differences. First, labor productivity
depends on the ages of the individuals. Different ages have different productivity levels εj and
after retirement age jr, age specific labor productivity becomes zero. Second effect to labor
productivity comes from types of the agents. Agents are assumed to born with different ability
levels αi and throughout their life they have the same ability level. Therefore people differ in
their potential current and future earnings from their birth. The distribution of ability types
is determined by the probabilities, i.e. pi > 0 denotes the probability of being born with abil-
ity αi. And last effect to the labor productivity is idiosyncratic uncertainty. Workers realize
idiosyncratic uncertainty at the beginning of each period ηt ∈ E. Each worker, independent
of their age and ability face the same stochastic process for labor productivity. The stochastic
process was assumed to follow a finite state Markov chain with stationary transition over time, i.e.
Q(η, E) = Prob(ηt+1 ∈ E|η = η) = Q(η, E) (1)
In the model, it was assumed that all the entries in the Markov transition matrix are strictly
positive.3 In the first year of their life, all individuals face average stochastic productivity i,e
η¯ =
∑
η ηΠ(η) where η ∈ E. In addition to the differences created by different ages and different
ability levels to the labor productivity, income and wealth distributions stochastic uncertainty
adds further dispersion. At this point progressive tax system can serve as an insurance market for
labor productivity risk and give individuals the chance to share this idiosyncratic risk effectively.
At each period, types of the individuals are characterized by (a, η, i, j), where at are asset
holdings (of one-period, risk-free bonds), ηt is stochastic labor productivity status at date t, i is
ability type and j is age. The notation for the measure of agents of type (a, η, i, j) at date t is
Φ(a, η, i, j)
It was assumed that individuals choose their consumption level cj and and leisure (1− lj)
3With this assumption, we quarantined that there exists a unique invariant distribution associated with Q
which is denoted by Π (See[Stokey and Lucas, 1989]
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level according to a standard time-separable utility function of the form;
E{
∑
j=1
βj−1
(cγj (1− lj)1−γ)1−σ
1− σ } (2)
where β is the time discount factor, γ determines utility weights household gives to con-
sumption and leisure, and σ is the degree of risk aversion. Expectation sign in front of the utility
function is emanated from the stochastic processes governing idiosyncratic labor productivity
and the probability of death at each period.
2.1.3 Technology
It was assumed that there is a representative firm and aggregate output is produced according
to a standard constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology.
Yt = K
α
t (AtNt)
1−α (3)
and the aggregate resource constraint is given by
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Gt 6 Kαt (AtNt)1−α (4)
where Yt, Kt and Ct stand for aggregate output, aggregate capital stock, aggregate consumption
and aggregate labor input in period t respectively and Nt is aggregate labor input measured in
efficiency units in period t. It was assumed that technological progress takes the labor augmenting
form and here the term At stands to capture this assumption i.e. At = (1 + g)
t−1A1. α ∈ (0, 1)
is capital share of output and γ is the depreciation rate depreciation rate for physical capital.
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2.1.4 Government Policy
The government administers social security system, and finance its spending by levying taxes.
In the model each individual after retirement take the same social security benefit, SSt. Thus
retirement benefit doesn’t depend on the households earnings history. The balanced budget so-
cial security system is satisfied in each period by the social security tax rate τss,t. In the model
only income tax code is subject to optimization of the policy maker and social security system
is taken exogenously.
Government has three fiscal instruments to finance exogenously given government con-
sumption {Gt}∞t=1. First, it levies tax on consumption expenditures by a proportional tax rate
τc, which is taken as exogenously. Second, accidental bequests, the resultant of the death proba-
bilities of individuals in each age, added to the government general revenue. Finally government
levies tax on individuals labor income which is yt = (1 − .5τsst)wtεjαiηl for the workers and
SSt for the retired agents and capital income with a constant tax rate τk, i.e. rtaτk.
4 Here wt
and rt are the notations for the wage per efficiency unit of labor and the risk-free interest rate,
respectively.
In the model, income tax code is taken as an arbitrary function of individual labor income,
in a given period, and denoted by T (·), where T (y) is the total income tax liability if pre-tax
income equals y. In addition to this assumption, one more restriction imposed on the tax code
that is, anonymity of the tax code is assumed, therefore tax rates doesn’t differ for different
earning levels.
In the model, government is choosing optimal progressivity of the income tax code as
a policy. Since income tax is defined as a function, the problem of the government becomes
choosing the optimal tax function T (·) , with respect to government budget constraint given the
4Here, in order to be consistent with the Turkish tax system we differentiated from the model of Conesa and
Krueger which we adapt. In the original model, assumed tax function is levied on individual’s labor income and
capital income i.e., the government can not condition tax rates on the source of income, but in our model we
assume that government can tax labor and capital income at different rates.
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stream of government expenditures and consumption tax rate.
2.1.5 Market Structure
In the model there is no explicit insurance markets for labor productivity risk. Agents can only
trade one-period risk-free bonds to self-insure against the risk of low labor productivity in the
future. Agents are not allowed to sell the bond short. This assumption impose a restriction on
the borrowing on all individuals instinctively and prevents agents from leaving debt behind them.
2.1.6 Definition of competitive equilibrium
Here, we will define competitive equilibrium of the economy and a balanced growth path. Individ-
ual asset holdings a ∈ Rt, individual labor productivity status η ∈ E = η1, η2, ..., ηn, individual
ability type i ∈ I = 1, ...,M and age j ∈ J = 1, 2..., J define the individual state of the economy
at time t. Furthermore aggregate state of the economy is the joint measure Φt over individual
state variables, i.e. asset positions, labor productivity status, ability and age.
Definition 1 Given a sequence of social security replacement rates {bt}∞t=1 consumption
tax rates {τc}∞t=1 and government expenditures {Gt}∞t=1 and initial conditions K1 and Φ1, a com-
petitive equilibrium is a sequence of functions for the household, {vt, ct, at′, lt} of production
plans for the firm, {Nt, Kt}∞t=1, government income tax functions {Tt}∞t=1, social security taxes
{τss,t}∞t=1 and benefits {SSt}∞t=1, prices {wt, rt}∞t=1, transfers {Trt}∞t=1 and measures {Φt}∞t=1 such
that:
1. Given prices, policies, transfers and initial conditions, for each t, vt solves the policy func-
tions ct, at
′ and lt.
9
vt(a, η, i, j) = maxa′,l,c{u(c, l) + βψj
∫
vt+1(a
′, η′, i, j + 1)Q(η, dη′) (5)
subject to,
(1 + τc)c+ a
′ = (1− τsst)wtεjαiηl + (1 + rt)a for j > jr
−Tt[(1− tausst)wtεjαiηl]− rtaτk
(6)
(1 + τc)c+ a
′ = SSt + (1 + rt)a− Tt[SSt]− rtaτk for j > jr (7)
a′ > 0 c > 0 0 6 l 6 1 (8)
2. Wage per efficiency unit of labor and wt and the risk-free interest rate rt satisfy:
rt = α(
AtNt
Kt
)1−α − δ, (9)
wt = (1− α)At( Kt
AtNt
)α. (10)
3. The social security policies satisfy
SSt = bt
wtNt∫
Φt(da× dη × di× {1, ..., jr − 1}) . (11)
τss,t =
SSt
wtNt
∫
Φt(da× dη × di× {jr, ..., J}). (12)
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4. Transfers are given by
Trt+1 =
∫
(1− ψj)at′Φt(da× dη × di× dj) (13)
5. Government budget balance:
Gt =
∫
Tt[(1− .5τsst)wtεjαiηl]× Φt(da× dη × di× {1, ..., jr − 1})
+
∫
Tt[SSt]× Φt(da× dη × di× {jr, ..., J})
+τc,t
∫
ct(a, η, i, j)Φt(da× dη × di× dj)
+τk
∫
rtaΦt(da× dη × di× dj)
+(1 + rt)Trt.
(14)
6. Market clearing
Kt =
∫
aΦt(da× dη × di× dj) (15)
Nt =
∫
εjαiηlt(a, η, i, j)Φt(da× dη × di× dj) (16)
∫
ct(a, η, i, j)Φt(da× dη × di× dj) +
∫
at
′(a, η, i, j)Φt(da× dη × di× dj)
= Kαt (AtNt)
1−α + (1− δ)Kt
(17)
7. Law of motion
(a)
Φt+1(A× E × I × J)
=
∫
Pt((a, η, i, j);A× E × I × J)Φt(da× dη × di× dj)
(18)
where
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Pt((a, η, i, j);A× E × I × J)
=
 Q(e, E)ψj if at′ ∈ A, i ∈ I,j + 1 ∈ J0 else,
(19)
(b)
Φt+1(A× E × I × J)
= (1 + n)t

∑
i∈k pi if 0 ∈ A, η ∈ E, i ∈ I, j ∈ J
0 else,
(20)
Definition 2 A balanced growth path is a competitive equilibrium in which bt = b1, τc,t = τc,1,
Gt = ((1 + g)(1 + n))
t−1G1, at′(.) = (1 + g)t−1a1′(.), ct(.) = (1 + g)t−1c1(.), lt(.) = l1(.),
Nt = (1+n)
t−1N1, Kt = ((1+g)(1+n))t−1K1, Tt = (1+g)t−1T1, τss,t = τss,1, SSt = (1+g)t−1SS1,
rt = r1, wt = (1 + g)
t−1w1, Trt = (1 + g)t−1Tr1 for all t > 1 and Φt((1 + g)t−1A,E, I, J) =
(1 + n)t−1Φ1(A,E, I, J) for all t and A ∈ R+. That is, per capita variables and functions grow
at constant gross growth rate 1 + g; aggregate variables grow at constant gross growth rate
(1 + g)(1 + n) and all other variables (and functions) are time-invariant.
We work this economy on the computer so first of all, we apply the standard normalization
procedure to make the household recursive problem stationary. 5
3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
3.1 Functional forms and calibration of the benchmark economy
In this section, we study the calibration of the model economy to the data from the Turkish
economy, selection of the parameter values of the model economy, and assumptions about the
functional forms. Calibration of the economy is examined through selecting values of demo-
graphic, technology and preference parameters.
5We follow [Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998] for the normalization of model, see appendix for detailed equations
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3.1.1 Demographics
We have set the demographic parameters in order to have a persistent mimicry between the
Turkey economy and stationary demographic structure of the model economy. The entrance
age to economy is 20, the retirement age is 606, and we assume that agents die for sure at age
85. Each period is set to 5 year, though the model ages consistent with the turning points we
mentioned are 1 for the entrance age to the economy, 9 for the retirement age and 13 for the
certain death age. The growth rate of population n is assumed to be constant and calculated as
the average of the long-run annual data series (between 1985 and 2005 data from the Turkish
Statistical Institute, TUIK), and is set to 1.8%.
The population structure in the model is determined together by the maximum age J, the
population growth rate and the survival probabilities. We assumed people survive for sure until
the retirement age and then until the certain death date they face a constant mortality rate.
We set mortality rate after age 60 so that the fraction of population over 60 to population of
working age equals 17.6 percent as observed in the data. We found this 17.6 ratio from the data
by simply dividing the population over 60 to the number of people total employed for the year
2000.7 Our demographic parameters are summarized in Table (1).
Table 1: Demographic Parameters
Parameter Value Target
Retirement Age 9(60) Assumed
Maximum Age 13(85) Certain death(assumed)
Mort Rate after ret. .2305 Dependency ratio=17.6%
Pop. growth 1.8% Data
6The official retirement age is 58 for woman and 60 for men currently, we take retirement age for men for
simplicity
7Data is taken from the Turkish Social Insurance Institute(SII) statistics and the Turkish Statistical Institute
(TUIK).
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3.1.2 Preferences
It was assumed that individuals choose their preferences of consumption level and leisure level
according to a standard time-separable utility function of the form:
U(c, l) =
(cγj (1− lj)1−γ)1−σ
1− σ (21)
We calibrate the preference parameters again using the Turkish data. Following Conesa
and Krueger (2005), we fix the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ to 4. Then we chose the
discount factor β in order for the equilibrium of our benchmark economy to imply a capital-
output ratio of 2.5.8. Since we set the period year to five, we divide this ratio to five, i.e the five
year counterpart of it is 2.5/5. We choose the share of consumption γ = .4 in the utility function
so that people of working age on average .33 of their discretionary time.
Table 2: Preferences Parameters
Parameter Value Target
β .127 K/Y=2.5
σ 4 Fixed
γ .4 Avg hours=1/3
3.1.3 Endowments
Agents have one unit of time to allocate between leisure and work. Their labor productivity
at work depends on three factors; type of the agent αi, age of the agent j and idiosyncratic
stochastic component ηt. These three factors with the proportion of the unit time agent devoted
to work determines the effective labor force, in a multiplicative fashion. i.e. εjαiηl. The age
specific component of the efficiency units is taken from [Bag˜ıs¸, 2009]. 9 They were summarized
8The capital-output ratio is taken from [S¸eref Saygılı et al., 2005]
9In his thesis, he used weekly hours and wages from 1985 to 2005 for each age group of agents. Then, he
evaluated hourly wages for each individual and mean hourly wages for each age group and mean hourly wage of
all individuals.(To find the mean hourly wages, he simply divided hourly wages by 4(weekly payments) and then
divided by working hours per week, which is average hourly wages for those working over 30 hours a week, that
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in Table (3).
Table 3: Age-specific productivity levels
Age Productivity
1 0.570
2 0.808
3 1.012
4 1.129
5 1.201
6 1.232
7 1.134
8 0.858
9 0.697
For the productivity levels depending on the ability and the stochastic idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, we use the findings of the [Conesa and Krueger, 2006]. They assumed two types for
ability, high productivity and low productivity, M = 2 with equal probabilities, pi = 0.5 for
i = 1, 2. They were presented in Table (4). And finally for the stochastic shocks, they assumed
individuals enter the economy with average productivity level η¯. Then through their lives they
hit by shocks which is changing according to a seven state Markov chain.10
We used these shock values and the distribution and create Markov chain using [Tauchen, 1986]
The states and the values are stated in Table (5).
is of full-time workers). Finally he found the age specific efficiency by dividing mean hourly wages of each age
group to the mean hourly wage of all.
10For more detailed description, see[Conesa and Krueger, 2006]
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Table 4: Ability
Parameter Value pi
α1 0.6115 0.5
α2 1.6354 0.5
Table 5: Stochastic Productivity
Parameter Value Π
η1 .447 0.034
η2 .589 0.135
η3 .749 0.214
η4 = η¯ .942 0.236
η5 1.185 0.214
η6 1.508 0.135
η7 1.986 0.034
3.1.4 Technology
Aggregate output is produced according to a standard constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
technology:
F (Kt, Nt) = K
α
t (AtNt)
1−α (22)
The capita share parameter α = 0.57 is taken from the paper [S¸eref Saygılı et al., 2005] The
constant growth trend for the aggregate variables is (1 +n)(1 + g), where n is the growth rate of
adult population and g is the growth rate of per capita GDP. We choose g = 2.23% in accordance
with the long-run growth rate of the per capita GDP for the Turkish data.
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt (23)
The depreciation rate δ is computed from the equation for capital accumulation by using
Kt+1 = ((1 + g)(1 + n))Kt where investment to output ratio is 0.226.
11 Technology parameters
11Investment output ratio is taken as the long run average investment share for the Turkish economy (from
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are summarized in Table (6).
Table 6: Technology Parameters
Parameter Value Target
α 0.57 Data
δ 5.3% I/Y=22.6%
g 2.23% Data
3.1.5 Government policies and the income tax function
The regulations about determination of taxable income have been regulated in tax legislation
in Turkey. Valuation measurements are included in Tax Procedures Law (TPL). In Income Tax
Law (ITL) and Corporation Tax Law (CTL), there are incomes and expenses that should be
taken into account while determining taxable income. Turkey’s actual tax function is a progres-
sive tax function. Marginal tax rates for 2006 is described as follows; for income less than 7,000
TL, tax rate is 15 percent, meanwhile, someone earning more than 7,000 TL would face a more
complicated calculation i.e. for income levels between 7,000 and 18,000; for the first 7000 TL,
1050 TL is taken and for more than 7,000 until 18,000, the tax rate is 20 percent, for income
levels between 18,000 and 44,000, for the first 18.000, 3.250 is taken and for more than 18,000
until 44,000, the tax rate is 27 percent, for income levels higher than 44,000, for the first 44,000,
9,190 TL is taken and for more than 44,000, the tax rate is 35 percent. These were summarized
in Table (7). In order to use this tax law in our model, first of all we take the annual average
income for 5,477$ per year from statistics of Maliye Bakanligi for the year 2006.12, then convert
the brackets according to the income levels in our calibrated economy.13
The replacement rate is chosen according to the actual social security law. We assumed
individuals work 30 years. Income replacement rate for retirement pension was 3.5 percent for
TUIK statistics)
12Maliye Bakanligi, ”Genel Faaliyet Raporu - 2006”, www.maliye.gov.tr - June 2007.
13See appendix for a detailed description.
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Table 7: Turkey individual income tax rates 2006
The Tax Base (TL) Tax
0-7000 15
7001 - 18000 20
18001- 44000 27
44001 and over 35
the first ten year, 2 percent for the second ten year and 1.5 percent for the third ten year periods.
Accordingly we choose the replacement rate as 70 per cent.
In order to satisfy the assumption of a balanced budget for the social security system,
and our assumptions about demographics, the required social security tax is τss = .128. The
calibrated rate is less than the actual social security tax which is roughly %30 on average. This
is so because in our model we ignore the possibility of early retirement which is a big case for
Turkish economy.14 Even with the 2006 reform, the minimum retirement age could not have
been restored to the official retirement age (which is 58 for woman and 60 for men currently).
Therefore there are many retirees even in their late-30’s. And for the OECD reports Turkey is
coming first between the OECD countries in terms of paying social security benefits for longest
years.15 The proportional consumption tax rate is set to 13.6%. The principal focus of this pa-
per is the income tax code, so we simply fix the consumption tax according to the Turkish data.16
For the main subject of our study, income tax code, we use functional form based on the
modern developments of the theory of equal sacrifice (see Gouveia and Strauss, 1994). The tax
function has beautiful features such that it yields a flexible functional form. It performs a wide
range of functional form, nesting from proportional tax code, to a variety of regressive and pro-
gressive tax codes. Finally this functional form serves us to find the optimal tax code with an
14For example, the 62% of the retirees from SSK retired before the minimum official retirement age can explain
us the huge difference between the actual social security tax and the calibrated one.
15For more detailed analysis of Turkish Social Security System see [Brook et al., 2006]
16Maliye Bakanligi, ”Genel Faaliyet Raporu - 2006”, www.maliye.gov.tr - June 2007.
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assumed welfare function form by varying the parameters of it. The tax code is in the form,
T (t) = a0(y − (y−a1 + a2)−1/a1), (24)
where (a0, a1, a2) are parameters, T (y) denotes the total tax paid by an individual, and y denotes
the pre-tax labor income.
The technical properties of this function are, first of all marginal and average tax rate
become a0 as y goes to infinity i.e. limy→∞T (y)/y = limy→∞T ′(y) = a0. Secondly with a1 = −1,
tax code turns to be constant value T (y) = −a0a1, and doesn’t depend on the income level.
Additionally when a1 goes to infinity tax code reflects a purely proportional system with tax
rate a0, T (y) = a0y. Finally, for strictly positive values of a1, the tax code becomes a progressive
system since,
t(y) =
T (y)
y
= a0(1− (1 + a2ya1)−1/a1), (25)
T ′(y) = a0(1− (1 + a2ya1)−1/a1−1) (26)
and thus the average and marginal taxes are strictly increasing function of income y. Here the
parameter a2 is used to satisfy the assumption of balanced budget in the balanced growth path
and one more thing about it is that it depends on the units of the measurements, in case all
variables are scaled by a fixed factor, a2 has to be adjusted for the sake of having the same tax
function.17 Technology parameters are summarized in Table (8).
17The parameter a2 has to be adjusted in the following way. When we scale income by a factorγ > 0, in order to
have the same function we should change a2 according to the following equation: a2ya1 = a¯2(γy)a1 and therefore
(a¯2 = a2γ−a1)
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Table 8: Policy Parameters
Parameter Value
τc 13.6%
τk 15%
τss 12.8%
b .7
3.2 The computational experiment
The optimal tax code is chosen so that with this tax code ex ante steady state expected utility
of a newborn is maximum. The social welfare function is
SWF (T ) =
∫
{(a,η,i,j):a=0,j=1}vt(a, η, i, j)dΦT
=
∑
i∈I pivt(a = 0, η = η¯, i, j = 1)
(27)
where T is the given tax code with parameters (a0, a1, a2), ΦT (a, η, i, j) is the invariant
measure of the corresponding balanced growth path, and vT (a, η, i, j) specifies the value function,
from here we are going to search for the parameters a0 and a1 which maximizes the utilitarian
social welfare function we choose;
T ? = arg max
(a0,a1)
SWF (T ) (28)
In order to find the parameters (a0, a1) so that the tax code that is maximizing our chosen
welfare function, we specify grids for these parameters. Then, we find the associated steady
state equilibrium for each parameter combination, and choose one combination that maximize
the welfare. Then we compare the benchmark economy and the economy associated with the
optimal tax code in terms of total efficient labor supply N , total capital stock K, total output
GDP . We looked at the average hours worked in order to analyze if the optimal tax code create
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any disincentives to work, and also we looked at the equity effects of the chosen tax code on the
distribution of pre-tax income, after-tax income, consumption and wealth.
4 THE OPTIMAL TAX CODE
After representing the economy on computer, we find that the optimal tax code have parameters
of a0 = .23 and a1 = 22. When we approximate it with a proportional tax code, the tax rate
will be roughly 23% with a fixed deduction of about half of the average labor income which is
roughly 3800TL.
In figure (1), we plot the marginal tax rates of the benchmark economy against the marginal
tax rates of the optimal tax code we have found. From the results we conclude for the optimal tax
code that marginal tax rates are lower for the upper and lower tails of the income distribution.
And we can say for the optimal tax code that for labor incomes under about half of the average
income, marginal tax rates are roughly zero.
Figure 1: Marginal tax rates under 2 tax regimes
In Tables (9), (10) and (11), we listed the macroeconomic aggregates for benchmark econ-
omy and for associated optimal tax economies in order to understand the economic forces un-
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Table 9: Comparison across tax codes I
Variable Benchmark Optimal(small open economy)
Parameter a0 - .23
Parameter a1 - 22
Interest rate r 12.8% 12.59%
Wages w - 1.8%
Average hours worked 0.300 -1.43 %
Total labor supply N - .68%
Capital stock - 3.84%
GDP Y - 2.33%
Aggregate consumption C - 2.76%
Gov. share in GDP 24.02% 23.47%
Total income tax as % of Y 5.1% 4.63%
Gini coefficient for pre-tax income 0.3733 0.3605
Gini coefficient for after-tax income 0.3848 0.3624
Gini coefficient for wealth 0.5236 0.4926
Gini coefficient for consumption 0.3328 0.3188
ECV - 6.24%
derlying the results after the optimal tax code. In our first and main exercise we optimize the
welfare keeping wages and interest rates fixed in order to reflect the small open economy char-
acter of the Turkish economy. In the second exercise we employ a pure proportional tax system
without exemption level and find the associated parameters optimizing the welfare. This exer-
cise helps us to isolate the efficiency from insurance and redistribution effect. We also optimize
the welfare function assuming closed economy and let the prices change accordingly. All the
associated macroeconomic aggregates are stated in Table (11) column three. And finally, we
take the parameters of the optimal tax code we found under the assumption of closed econ-
omy, but this time we don’t let the prices change. This exercise is done for the sake of isolating
the effects of higher steady state capital stock and wages. The results are presented in Table (11).
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Beside the understanding we get from the comparison of macroeconomic aggregates, we
compute the welfare differences between different tax codes. The tool we utilize for compar-
ison is CEV(consumption equivalent variation) which measures how much we should increase
consumption uniformly, in each labor leisure allocation, in order to equate the welfare of the
benchmark economy to the associated optimal tax system. The CEV values we found are posi-
tive which is the sign of increase in the welfare with the new tax code compared to the benchmark
system.
Table 10: Comparison across tax codes II
Variable Benchmark Proportional
Parameter a0 - .09
Parameter a1 - 0
Interest rate r 12.8% 13%
Wages w - -2%
Average hours worked 0.300 4.46%
Total labor supply N - 7.56%
Capital stock - 3.6%
GDP Y - 5.32 %
Aggregate consumption C - 7.93%
Gov. share in GDP 24.02% 22.83%
Total income tax as % of Y 5.1% 3.85%
Gini coefficient for pre-tax income 0.3733 .3775
Gini coefficient for after-tax income 0.3848 .3856
Gini coefficient for wealth 0.5236 .5345
Gini coefficient for consumption 0.3328 .3563
ECV - -0.5%
In our first exercise, we noticed that total labor supply and capital accumulation increased
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Table 11: Comparison across tax codes III
Variable Benchmark Optimal(closed economy) Fixed(w,r)
Parameter a0 - .27 .27
Parameter a1 - 22 22
Interest rate r 12.8% 12.58% 12.58%
Wages w - 2.1% 0%
Average hours worked 0.300 -1.93 % -2.83%
Total labor supply N - .01% -.01%
Capital stock - 3.03% 3.13%
GDP Y - 1.43% .96%
Aggregate consumption C - 1.35% 1%
Gov. share in GDP 24.02% 23.68% 23.58%
Total income tax as % of Y 5.1% 4.92% 4.63%
Gini coefficient for pre-tax income 0.3733 0.3599 0.3606
Gini coefficient for after-tax income 0.3848 0.3613 0.3623
Gini coefficient for wealth 0.5236 0.4942 0.493
Gini coefficient for consumption 0.3328 0.3121 0.3085
ECV - 7.3% 7.1%
by .68%, 3.84% respectively in the optimal tax code, compared to the benchmark economy.
Thus, by the nature of production function, these two effects cause GDP per capita to increase
by 2.33%. In the light of this result and the numerous decrease we noticed in the marginal
tax rates for the high end of the income distribution, we can conclude that optimal tax system
reduced disincentives to save and work for upper tail of the income distribution. Besides this,
although there is a vastly decrease of 1.43% in the average hours worked, total labor supply in-
creases which is caused by the high ability, high productivity agents. They respond with a higher
labor supply to the decrease in marginal tax rates for their income brackets. Finally, the share
of government expenditure and so average tax rate required to fund government expenditures
goes down. With higher GDP after the new income tax code and lower fractions devoted to
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the government outlays, there is an increase in fractions of private consumption and investment
which is an increase about 2.76% for aggregate consumption. Column 3 of Table (9) presents
the results from the exercise.
The optimal tax system not only increases the incentives to work and save but also creates
a more equal income, wealth and consumption distribution. We can see it with the decrease in
the amounts of Gini coefficients for income, consumption and wealth. For the after-tax income
Gini coefficients, firstly under the optimal tax system, the lower tail of proportion 30% faces
increase in their incomes, with almost 83% of them pay zero tax, and the remaining 17% have
marginal tax rate lower than 15% of their income that they have to pay under the benchmark
tax system. Secondly the individuals in the middle class of 60% of the income distribution which
corresponds to the second interval of the current tax system have to pay more income tax under
the optimal tax system. These two effects make the incomes of the lower class and the middle
class come close to each other. But on the other hand, under the optimal tax system since the
most upper class, high productivity and high ability agents have to pay less, they save and work
more under the new tax code, and their income increase disproportionately. This effect is in the
way to increase the dispersion of the income. Since their proportion in the population is low
compared to the middle class, the first two effects dominate the negative effect of the increase
in the incomes of the upper class. It should also be noticed that after tax income Gini increases
more proportionately than the before tax income Gini, this stems from the deduction of about
half of the average income. The decrease in consumption Gini is the result of more equally
distributed income.
We compare the benchmark economy with a pure proportional tax system without any
deduction. All the macroeconomic aggregates increase with high proportions but the welfare
of the agents and equality in income distributions suffer with the pure proportional tax code.
In this economy, fixed deduction is absent, so that we cannot realize increase in the equality
of income and thus consumption. Both consumption Gini and income Gini increased compared
to the benchmark economy. Although GDP per capita increases by a huge amount 5.32% and
aggregate consumption increases by 7.93% under purely proportional tax system, social welfare
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is lower. In purely proportional tax system, insurance against idiosyncratic income shocks and
insurance against being born as a low type does not exist. The increase in the welfare of the
high ability individuals is dominated by the decrease in the welfare losses of low ability agents.
The results can be seen in Table (10).
Finally we assumed closed economy, and allow prices change accordingly and, in order
to isolate the effects of higher steady state capital stock and wages, we fixed the wage rate and
interest rate to the benchmark balanced growth path levels. First of all, We found the optimal tax
system for the closed economy, which has the parameters of a0 = .27 and a1 = 22. For the closed
economy exercise, the results about the directions of the macroeconomic aggregates, equality of
distributions and welfare are qualitatively similar with those of we found for the optimal tax
system under the assumption of small open economy. Then we calculate a new steady state with
these tax parameters and the fixed prices. By doing this we wanted to present pure effects of
new tax system. We wanted to see the portion of welfare gains caused by higher capital and
higher wages and the portion resulted from the efficiency gains from decreased disincentives on
labor supply, having partial insurance against income shocks and more equity in the distribution
of income. We see that, when we reset the effect on welfare gains of the increase in steady state
capital and wages, welfare gains decreased slightly from 7.3 to 7.1. This reflects the fact that a
huge portion of the welfare gains is due to the decreased disincentives on labor supply by lower
marginal tax rates and more equity in the distribution of income. In column 3 and 4 of Table
(11), we present the associated results.
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5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, it has been shown that, the optimal progressive income tax for Turkey can be
well approximated by a flat tax rate of 23% with a fixed deduction of about half of the average
income for Turkish citizens which is roughly 3800TL. This results are found under a stochas-
tic dynamic general equilibrium model with a utilitarian welfare function. With this tax system
upper tail of the income distribution faces lower marginal tax rates compared to the actual Turk-
ish tax system which reflects that the disincentives on labor supply and capital accumulation
stemming from high marginal taxes is shortened by the new tax system. And also the lower
tail of the income distribution is benefited from the deduction of this new tax system. Thus
the optimal tax system compensates for the absent insurance markets and provides insurance
against idiosyncratic labor income uncertainty. This system implies lower tax burdens for the
two ends of the income distribution, but on the other hand the tax burden middle class faces
increase compared to the current tax system. Although we did not analyze, the welfare gains of
the lower and the upper class, and the welfare losses middle class face, may suggest that if there
is such a reform towards the optimal tax system, the middle class may be the biggest opponent
to the proposed tax reform.
Welfare gains are very substantial with this tax reform, in order to make people indiffer-
ent between the actual tax system and optimal tax system, consumption should increase 6.2%
for all agents and for all states of the world. The population structure of Turkey of about the
population weights for the income levels, significantly effects the results concerning the equity
in distributions of wealth, pre-tax income, after-tax income, and thus consumption. All the
Gini coefficients decrease showing there is more equal distribution between the different types of
population after the optimal tax code.
For further work, also the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards
the optimal tax system that is desired in terms of equity and efficiency of labor supply can be
analyzed in order to see if the reform is feasible or not.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Tax brackets
We convert tax brackets as follows. First of all, since the income tax brackets is revised according
to the average income of the individuals of the previous year, income tax brackets change over
almost every year. Thus we take 2006 tax brackets for our analysis. Average income for the year
2006 is 5,477$, we convert it to TL by simply multiplying it with the average exchange rate.
We will describe it for just the bottom limit of the second tax bracket and the others are found
accordingly. The ratios of the actual economies bottom level bracket BA2 to the average income
of the actual economy AM should be same for our calibrated economy BC2, so we follow this
path; We find the mean income for our calibrated economy MC. Then we multiply it to the
ratio we described before. The corresponding tax brackets is found by;
BC2 = MC
BA2
AM
(29)
A.2 Normalization
In a balanced growth equilibrium, all per capita variables and functions grow at a constant gross
growth rate (1+g), aggregate variables grow at a constant gross growth rate (1+r)(1+g). Note
that rt, τt, τss,t and τc are constant.
We transform the model into a stationary form by dividing the utility function and budget
constraint by At. Let define our new variables as; c˜ = c/At, a˜ = a/At, a˜′ = a′/At, ˜SSt = SSt/At,
w˜ = w/At, T˜t = Tt/At.
Here for the tax function, we can think in the way that an agent with income y in period
one, faces the same average and marginal tax rate as an agent with income (1 + g)t1y in period
t, that is;
Tt[(1 + g)
t1y] = T1[y](1 + g)
t−1 (30)
Now we can rewrite the model as follows. First, we divide through the consumer’s budget
constraint by At and rewrite the consumer’s preferences by using the definition of c˜. Thus, the
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consumer’s problem becomes
E[A
γ(1−σ)
0
∑
j=1
[β˜j−1
(c˜γj (1− lj)1−γ)1−σ
1− σ ] (31)
subject to
(1 + τc)c˜+ a˜′ = (1− τsst)w˜tεjαiηl + (1 + rt)a˜ for j > jr
−T˜t[(1− .5τsst)wtεjαiηl]− rta˜τk
(32)
(1 + τc)c˜+ a˜′ = ˜SSt + (1 + rt)a˜− T˜t[SSt]− rta˜τk for j > jr (33)
a˜′ > 0 c˜ > 0 0 6 l 6 1 (34)
where β˜ = β(1 + g)γ(1−σ)
A.3 Gini Coefficients
Since we have discrete probability distribution, finding the gini coefficients we follow the following
way. We reset points with zero probabilities in the discrete distribution f(yi) and indexed the
matter of gini coefficient in increasing order i.e.(yi < yi+1):
G = 1−
∑n
i=1 f(yi)(Si−1 + Si)
Sn
(35)
where
Si =
i∑
j=1
f(yj)yj and S0 = 0 (36)
In our calculations, we apply same procedure to consumption, pre-tax income, after-tax
income and wealth of the population and fin all corresponding gini coefficients.
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